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Abstract
Previous studies demonstrated that human motor actions are not always monitored by perceptual awareness and that
implicit motor control plays a key role in performing actions. In addition, appropriate evaluation of our own motor behavior
is vital for human life. Here we combined a reaching task with a visual backward masking paradigm to induce an implicit
motor response that is congruent or incongruent with the visual perception. We used this to investigate (i) how we evaluate
such implicit motor response that could be inconsistent with perceptual awareness and (ii) the possible contributions of
reaching error, external visual cues, and internal sensorimotor information to this evaluation. Participants were instructed,
after each trial, to rate their own reaching performance on a 5-point scale (i.e., smooth – clumsy). They also needed to
identify a color presented at a fixation point that could be changed just after the reaching start. The color was linked to the
prime-mask congruency (i.e., congruent-green, incongruent-blue) in the practice phase, and then inconsistent pairs
(congruent-blue or incongruent-green) were introduced in the test phase. We found early trajectory deviations induced by
the invisible prime stimulus, and such implicit motor responses are significantly correlated with the action evaluation score.
The results suggest the ‘‘conscious’’ action evaluation is properly monitoring online sensory outcomes derived by implicit
motor control. Furthermore, statistical path analyses showed that internal sensorimotor information from the motor
behavior modulated by the invisible prime was the predominant cue for the action evaluation, while the color-cue
association learned in the practice phase in some cases biases the action evaluation in the test phase.
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Introduction
We believe that we perform our daily actions with continuous
access to conscious awareness, but previous studies have demon-
strated that this is not true and that we are actually aware ‘‘only of
the tip of the action iceberg’’ (e.g., [1]). Two examples of this
dissociation between movement and awareness stand out. First,
several studies [2–5] have shown that a stimulus that cannot be
perceived consciously influences motor responses in a visual
backward masking paradigm. This paradigm is based on a
psychophysical procedure in which conscious perception of a
briefly presented stimulus (i.e., the prime) is cancelled by masking
another ‘mask’ stimulus (e.g., [6–8]). Second, participants can
automatically adjust their motor behavior for a target shift during
their movements even when they are not consciously aware of the
target location change (e.g., [9,10]).
These studies have demonstrated the dissociation between
perceptual awareness and implicit motor control. But if we can act
without perceptual awareness, one might ask how we recognize
and perceive the consequences of such actions (i.e., an experience
of action, e.g., [11]). Johnson and Haggard [12] demonstrated a
dissociation between motor awareness and perceptual awareness.
Specifically, they found that participants can reproduce the spatial
details of a visuomotor adjustment in double-step pointing,
regardless of perceptual awareness of a target shift when the
target location is actually shifted. In our daily life, a dramatic
example of motor behavior’s betrayal of conscious awareness is
stepping on a stopped escalator. Fukui, Kimura, Kadota, Shimojo,
and Gomi [13] compared the properties of motor behavior toward
a stopped escalator with those toward a moving escalator and
toward a wooden stairs that mimicked the stopped escalator. We
found that, just after one steps onto a stopped escalator (not a
wooden stairs), one experiences a forward sway of the upper body
subconsciously driven by a habitual motor program with some
kind of odd sensation, despite a suitable action intention and full
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stopped). Fukui et al. [13] also, in a sense, demonstrated a
dissociation between perceptual awareness and motor awareness
(i.e., motor awareness against perceptual awareness, rather than
motor awareness without perceptual awareness). We further found
the participants indeed feel an odd sensation in such situation,
while Johnson and Haggard [12] did not report any unusual
sensations associated with visuomotor adjustment without percep-
tual awareness of target shift. We suggest that unusual sensations
emerge depending on whether a monitoring system does or does
not detect conflict between action intention and motor outcome
(cf. [14]).
If the brain indeed evaluates the consequent sensation induced
by implicit motor control, we might ask what information is critical
for this evaluation. In particular, online sensorimotor information,
final motor error, and associated sensory information might all
contribute.
Recent studies stress that prediction plays a key role in the
emergence of motor awareness [15–18] as well as in recent motor
control theory (e.g., [19–21]). According to these studies,
appropriate monitoring of the sensorimotor congruence between
prediction (computed by a forward internal model) and actual
sensory feedback is crucial for action evaluation. Alternatively, the
action evaluation could be inferred retrospectively (e.g., [22,23]).
According to this hypothesis, even an external cue irrelevant to
motor behavior itself could be used in action evaluation. Within a
framework of these two theories (see also [24]), further questions
about the action evaluation arise as described below. Tackling
these questions is important for revealing the mechanism of
performance improvement [25] and elucidating the relationship
between sensorimotor integration and the self-specifying process
[26].
1. When we evaluate our own motor behavior induced against
perceptual awareness, could online deviation by implicit motor
control be monitored and used in the matching process of
sensorimotor congruence (cf. [27])? Or is final motor error a
predominant clue for such a matching process (cf. [28])?
2. When an external cue associated with motor behavior happens
to conflict with the outcome induced by implicit motor control,
does the external cue, which had previously a perfect
association with one’s own motor behavior but has now an
opposite association, mistakenly bias the action evaluation?
To examine these questions, we combined a reaching task with
a visual backward masking paradigm. A reaching task is more
appropriate than a simple reaction time task for revealing a
dynamic information process [29]. In this task the reach trajectory
is specified by a combination of mask and target stimuli, but the
mask was preceded by an invisible prime. The prime induces
implicit motor control in the opposite direction to the reach target,
i.e., against perceptual awareness of the target [29–33]. Further-
more, the prime-mask congruency was linked to the color of a
fixation point (i.e., congruent-green, incongruent-blue) in a
practice phase to associate action evaluation with the color, and
additional new pairs (either congruent-blue or incongruent-green)
were introduced in a small percentage in a test phase in two
different participant groups (i.e., an incongruent-green group and
a congruent-blue one). Here our focus is to examine whether,
under such a condition, participants are able to appropriately
monitor their action using online sensorimotor information or
whether they evaluate their action using final reaching error and/
or associated sensory information (i.e., the color of a fixation
point). In simple terms, what information do participants rely on
more for the action evaluation in the test phase when they happen
to perform the trials in the new condition (congruent-blue or
incongruent-green), which now conflicts with the association learnt
in the practice phase? It is noteworthy that the external color cue
itself originally has no causal relationship with one’s own motor
behavior induced by the prime-mask congruency and is associated
with it during the practice phase.
The results show that monitoring online sensorimotor informa-
tion as specified by the masked prime plays a predominant role in
action evaluation. The action consequence (i.e., endpoint error)
partly contributes, but its effect on action evaluation is much
smaller than the effect of online sensorimotor information.
Furthermore, statistical path analyses reveal some involvement of
a noncausal external color cue linked to prime-mask congruency
associated in the practice phase, suggesting some visual cue effect
for the action evaluation.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eight males and 18 females (20–40 years of age, mean
age=28.366.3 years) participated in the experiment. All partic-
ipants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and none of
them had any motor or sensory abnormalities. They gave written
informed consent to participate in the study, which was approved
by the NTT Communication Science Laboratories Research
Ethics Committee. All participants were right-handed. This
experiment consisted of two phases: a color-action association
learning phase (practice phase) and a test phase. Considering the
aim of this study, we excluded the following participants from the
analyses: 1) Those who (two participants) noticed the existence of
the prime stimulus during the experiment due to violation of the
instructions. For example, they were fixating not the fixation point
but prime-mask stimuli themselves. 2) Those who (three partic-
ipants) showed no (or little) effect of implicitly driven motor
behavior (by invisible prime) on action evaluation in the practice
phase. As for the latter exclusion case, since we wanted to examine
what information (online sensorimotor information, endpoint
error, or an external cue) is the more critical clue for the action
evaluation in the test phase, we needed an association between
color and action in the practice phase, which means a higher score
in the congruent-green condition and a lower one in the
incongruent-blue condition (see Procedure and Result sections
for details).
In the test phase, we divided the participants into two groups: an
incongruent-green group (three males and eight females, mean
age=28.366.7 years) and congruent-blue group (three males and
seven females, mean age=27.666.9 years) as described below in
detail.
Apparatus
Participants viewed the CRT display (60 Hz) from a distance of
approximately 42 cm, with their head movement restricted by a
chin-rest (see Fig. 1A).
Right- or left-pointing prime and mask stimuli were regular
triangles whose sides were 1.5 and 6.0 degrees, respectively. The
centroid of the prime triangle was located at 10 deg above the
fixation point in the vertical plane. The outer contour of the prime
stimuli fit exactly within the inner contour of the cutout of the
mask triangles. A neutral mask was formed from the superimpo-
sition of the two triangles (see Figs. 1B and 1C).
The prime triangle was presented 100 ms after a button had
been released at the start position. It was presented for 17 ms. The
prime-mask stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) was set at 50 ms
Internal and External Cues for Action Evaluation
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target points were simultaneously presented with the mask
stimulus in each near or far condition (near: 6.8 deg, far:
9.3 deg from the center of the cutout, see Fig. 1B). The mask
stimulus was also a cue stimulus for reaching direction.
The reaching end position was recorded with a touch panel
(Keytec. Inc). The right-hand position (monitored by a reflective
marker placed on the back of the hand around the bottom of the
ring finger) was recorded with a three-dimensional motion capture
system (ProReflex, Qualisys, Sweden) at a frequency of 250 Hz.
Procedure
Before a reaching task, we needed to obtain the perceptual
threshold of prime stimulus intensity so that participants would not
be able to recognize the prime triangle in the main experiment.
For this purpose, we had participants perform a prime identifi-
cation task using a Bayesian adaptive psychometric procedure,
QUEST [34]. Participants were requested to report the direction
of the prime triangle in the two-alternative choice manner for
prime (right, left) and mask (right, left) combinations randomly
selected (80 trials). QUEST is a procedure for running each trial at
whatever signal strength would contribute most to minimizing the
variance of the final threshold estimate (see also [35]). Such a
procedure combines the experimenter’s prior knowledge
(tGuess=21, tGuessSd=5.0, beta=3.5, delta=0.01, gam-
ma=0.5 in QUEST software of Psychophysics Toolbox [36])
and the observer’s responses (i.e., right or left) in past trials in
choosing the signal strength for the next trial, and, in the end,
estimating threshold. After each response, a Gaussian probability
density function is updated by Bayes’ rule. Each trial is placed at
the current maximum-likelihood estimate of the threshold. The
threshold of each participant was set at 51%, which is rather
conservative compared to the threshold generally assigned (i.e.,
about 70%). We confirmed that the final threshold estimates
appropriately converged. With this setting, we assumed that the
performance level of each participant would be almost chance
level. After this task, we also confirmed, from participants’ reports
(cf. [37]), that participants could not identify the direction of the
prime stimulus at all.
Next, participants performed the reaching task using the
backward masking paradigm in a darkened room. As shown in
Figs. 1A and 1B, the participants were asked to place their heads
on a chin-rest and to fixate a green fixation point (diameter of
0.85 deg). Each trial started by participants’ pressing a button
placed at the start position with the index finger. The initial
reaching target (white dot, diameter of 0.6 deg) was presented
10 deg above the fixation point for 500 ms from the start time of
the button press, and participants were instructed to intend to
Figure 1. Experimental setup and protocol. (A) Configuration of the experimental apparatus. Participants rested their heads on the chin rest and
were required to make reaching movements from the button switch to the target displayed on the monitor while they watched the fixation point.
The motion of the reflective marker was recorded by the motion capture system as the kinematics of the reaching movement. (B) Visual stimulus
layout. The diameter of the fixation point participants were asked to watch during the trials was 0.85 deg (shown as a green filled circle). Right- or
left-pointing prime and mask stimuli were regular triangles whose sides were 1.5 and 6.0 deg, respectively. The centroid of the prime triangle was
located at 10 deg above the fixation point in the vertical plane. Possible targets (white filled circle, diameter of 0.6 deg) were located at 6.8 and
9.3 deg horizontally from the centroid on each side, respectively. (C) Time sequence of the visual stimuli (prime-mask combination) in each condition.
While the fixation point remained green in the congruent(incongruent)-green and neutral conditions after the button release, the color of the fixation
point was switched from green to blue in the incongruent(congruent)-blue conditions at the same timing of prime onset. The outer contour of the
prime stimuli fit exactly within the inner contour of the cutout of the mask triangles. Except for trials in the neutral condition, either the right- or left-
target point (white filled circle, diameter: 0.6 deg) reappeared according to the direction of the mask stimulus, and feedback about the reaching
endpoint (green filled circle, diameter: 0.6 deg) was also provided after the reaching movement (i.e., contact with touch panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g001
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beeps at intervals of 200 ms were provided. Participants were
required to start moving (i.e., release the button) at the second
‘‘go’’ beep and reach for the target point. When a neutral mask
stimulus was presented, the participants were required to reach for
the initial target corresponding to the center of the cutout. The
participants had to correct their reaching movements according to
the direction of the mask triangle and reach for the point
consistent with the mask direction out of the two presented target
points when a right- or left- pointed triangle mask was presented
(the mask stimulus was thus also a cue stimulus for reaching
direction as mentioned above). After the reaching movements, the
target point and reaching endpoint were shown in white and
green, respectively, except in the neutral condition. There was no
feedback error information when the neutral condition was
applied. The participants were instructed not to shift their gaze
to the triangle (mask) stimulus or the target point but to keep
watching the fixation point during the trial.
After each trial, except those in the neutral condition, the
participants were requested to answer the following two questions:
Did the fixation point color remain green or did it switch from
green to blue (the color identification task)? To what extent did
you appropriately perform the movement according to your
intention of reaching for the target based on the stimulus (mask)
direction? The second question was reported on a 5-point scale
(i.e., 5 - very smooth; 1 - very clumsy).
The reaching task consisted of two phases: a color-action
association learning phase (practice phase) and a test phase. In the
practice and test phases, 384 and 192 trials were completed,
respectively. A short break was inserted every 48 trials. In the
practice phase, there were three conditions as shown in Fig. 1C: 1)
congruent-green (50%), in which the prime direction was
congruent with the mask one [prime-mask combinations of
right-right (RR) and left-left (LL)] and the color of fixation point
remained green; 2) incongruent-blue (33%), in which the prime
direction was incongruent with the mask one [prime-mask
combinations: right-left (RL) condition and left-right (LR)] and
the color of fixation point was switched to blue; 3) neutral (17%),
in which neutral mask triangle without the prime was presented
and the color of the fixation point remained green. In the test
phase, an additional color-stimuli combination condition, either
incongruent-green or congruent-blue, was inserted in addition to
the congruent-green, incongruent-blue, and neutral conditions (see
Fig. 1C). The rate of each condition was as follows. Congruent-
green condition 50%, incongruent-blue condition 25%, incongru-
ent-green or congruent-blue condition 8%, and neutral condition
17%. Trial order was pseudo randomized in both phases. The
participant group in the practice phase was divided into two
groups in the test phase: an incongruent-green group, in which the
incongruent-green condition was inserted, and a congruent-blue
group, in which the congruent-blue condition was inserted.
Data Processing and Analysis
The hand position data were temporally aligned with respect to
the button release and were filtered offline using a fourth-order
Butterworth filter (double-sided) with a cutoff frequency of 10 Hz.
The velocity was calculated from three-point numerical time
differentiations of the filtered position data. Our main interest is
the effect of the prime direction on motor behavior, so we
analyzed the following data pooled from both target positions (i.e.,
near and far conditions). To quantify the effect of the prime
stimulus on motor behavior, we calculated the mean velocity of a
100-ms-time window from 200 to 300 ms after prime onset in
each condition. We adopted the mean X-velocity as the index of
the prime effect because velocity is more suitable for detecting the
transient behavioral changes than position (trajectory). The
response onset to the prime stimulus was defined as the time
from which the velocity differences between RR (LL) and LR (RL)
continuously exceeded a threshold value of 30 mm/s for at least
40 ms in a window between 150 and 300 ms after the prime onset.
The threshold value approximately corresponded to 2 SDs of the
velocity during a period of 0–50 ms after the button release (cf.
[38]). Endpoint error was calculated as the Euclidean (linear)
distance in two-dimensional space (on the vertical plane) between
the endpoint of the reaching movement recorded with the touch
panel and the target position (see Figs. 1A and 1C). Mean
endpoint error in each condition was averaged by the sum of each
trial’s endpoint error in each condition. Repeated measures
ANOVAs were applied to these mean values. Specifically, the
prime direction (right, left) and mask one (right, left) were within-
participant factors for velocity, and mask direction (right, left) and
conditions [congruent-green, incongruent-blue] were within-par-
ticipant factors for the endpoint error and action evaluation score
in the practice phase. In the test phase, the prime direction (right,
left) and condition [congruent-green, incongruent-blue, incongru-
ent-green (or congruent-blue)] were within-participant factors for
the velocity, and the mask direction (right, left) and conditions
[congruent-green, incongruent-blue, incongruent-green (or con-
gruent-blue)] were within-participant factors for the endpoint
error. Tukey’s HSD procedure was used for post-hoc comparison
of means (alpha level =.05). As for the action evaluation score, we
are interested in whether the action evaluation is modulated by the
color cue itself, so we performed planned t tests on the mean
evaluation scores for incongruent-blue and incongruent-green
conditions in the incongruent-green group and on those for
congruent-green and congruent-blue conditions in the congruent-
blue group.
Finally, to identify the information used in the action evaluation,
we introduced path analyses. We have the assumption that online
corrections induced by the invisible prime stimulus and/or
consequent endpoint error are potential candidates that could
affect the action evaluation in the practice phase. In the test phase,
the color cue would inferentially contribute to the evaluation of
one’s own action. The color cue variable introduced in the test
phase was nominal scale, so we used a dummy variable for the
analysis; that is, blue was transformed to 0 and green was
transformed to 1. For each variable, we calculated the variance
inflation factor (VIF), which, as suggested by Myers [39], should
be less than 10 to avoid multicollinearity problems. We focused on
the standardized path coefficients between variables. Standardized
path coefficients indicate the relative effect of variables within the
model.
Results
As mentioned above, we excluded participants who showed no
significant different action evaluation scores between congruent-
green and incongruent-blue conditions in the practice phase (i.e.,
the second exclusion case in the Participants section). After the
experiment, participants reported whether they had not noticed
the existence of the prime stimulus during the experiment.
Practice Phase
The mean correct rate in the color identification task in the
practice phase was 97.4% (SD=2.4%), indicating participants
performed the color discrimination task nearly perfectly. Only
correct trials in the color identification task were analyzed.
Internal and External Cues for Action Evaluation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34985The 21 participants showed a significantly higher congruent-
green score than incongruent-blue one, as revealed by each
participant’s t test. Mean evaluation scores of congruent-green and
incongruent-blue conditions are shown in Fig. 2A (t(20)=11.03,
p,.001, r=.93). Out of these participants, 14 reported after
finishing the practice phase that they felt smoother performance
for the green cue and clumsier performance for the blue one.
Seven participants reported that they felt no difference between
the green and blue cues even though they showed a significant
difference of action evaluation scores between the congruent-green
and incongruent-blue conditions. The participants who were
aware of the association between their own performance (induced
by the prime-mask combination) and the color cue (i.e., the
‘‘aware’’ group in Fig. 2B) showed a significantly larger difference
of mean evaluation scores between the congruent-green and
incongruent-blue conditions than those who did not notice such an
association (‘‘not aware’’ group in Fig. 2B, t(19)=22.454,
p=.024, r=.49). As mentioned in the introduction, the color
cue itself essentially has no causal link with one’s own motor
behavior, so such association emerged through trials in the
practice phase.
Invisible prime affects online motor control. Figures 3A
and 3B respectively show the trajectories on the horizontal plane
and x-directional velocity profiles. When the prime stimulus was
incongruent with the mask one (i.e., RL or LR conditions),
trajectories shown by blue curves were directed to the opposite
direction of the mask stimulus (i.e., the direction of the prime) and
then modified to reach for the appropriate direction of the mask
triangle. As shown in Fig. 3B, the velocity patterns started to
deviate approximately 200 ms after prime onset. Mean response
onset to the prime stimulus in reaching for the left target was
209.1 ms (SD=26.2) and that in reaching for the right target was
204.2 ms (SD=20.5) (see Fig. 3C). Mean velocity of the 100-ms-
time window (from 200 to 300 ms after the prime onset indicated
by the gray area in Fig. 3B) in each condition was calculated and
an ANOVA with prime (right and left) and mask (right and left) as
within-participant factors revealed the main effect of prime (F(1,
20)= 99.982, p,.001, partial g
2=.833, see Fig. 3D), suggesting the
invisible prime affects online motor control. We also confirmed the
same significant effects on the X-position at 300 ms after the prime
onset. As the strength of the implicit motor control, we calculated
each participant’s difference of mean velocities of the 100-ms-time
window indicated by the gray area in Fig 3B in both mask
conditions (see also Fig. 3D). As shown in Fig. 3E, we found the
awareness of the association between their own performance
(induced by prime-mask combination) and the color cue did not
have any relationship with the strength of the implicit motor
control induced by the invisible stimulus (t(19)=2.970, p=.344
for the left mask, t(19)=2.422, p=.678 for the right mask).
Motor behavior induced by implicit perception correlates
with action evaluation. Fig. 4A shows endpoint distributions
for a single participant who reached to the far targets. In the
incongruent-blue condition, participants sometimes failed to point
to the appropriate target and mistakenly reached to the opposite
side. Such cases indicate the effect of the invisible prime triangle
was so influential on motor behavior that the participants could
not sufficiently modify the trajectory during the reaching
movement. In these cases, participants reported they did not
know why they performed in such a way, despite their having full
awareness of the mask (cue) stimulus direction. Furthermore, some
of them reported that such inappropriate performance was due to
a loss of concentration during the task.
We evaluated the endpoint error (Fig. 4B), and an ANOVA
with mask triangle (right, left) and condition (congruent-green,
incongruent-blue) as within-participant factors revealed that the
main effect of mask (F(1, 20)=14.717, p=.001, partial g
2=.595)
and condition (F(1, 20)=13.118, p=.002, partial g
2= 567) but no
mask6condition interaction (F(1, 20)=.058, p=.813). There were
significant differences between congruent-green and incongruent-
blue conditions in both mask triangle stimuli (i.e., right and left).
We next calculated the mean evaluation scores (Fig. 5) and
found the main effect of mask (F(1, 20)= 25.047, p,.001, partial
g
2=.556), condition (F(1, 20)=122.733, p,.001, partial g
2=.860)
and the mask6condition interaction (F(1, 20)= 5.061, p=.036,
partial g
2=.202). There were significant differences between
congruent-green and incongruent-blue conditions for both mask
stimuli and there were also significant differences between mask
triangle directions in both conditions (congruent-green, incongru-
ent-blue). These results indicated that participants felt their
performance was poorer against their intention in the incongru-
ent-blue condition.
The results in Fig. 5 would suggest the motor behavior induced
by the invisible prime affected the action evaluation. To examine
what information (the velocity modification during movement or
the endpoint error after movement) is critical for the action
evaluation, we applied a path analysis to the hypothesized model
in Fig. 6, which shows the mean path coefficients of mask L and R
conditions. We found no VIFs over 10 in the analysis of each
participant. Table 1 summarizes the standardized path coefficients
in the model for each participant. Path coefficients from velocity
change to action evaluation showed higher values than those from
endpoint error to action evaluation except in the following cases:
Participants 7, 17, and 21 in both mask stimuli conditions and
participants 11 and 14 in the left-pointing mask stimulus (mask L)
condition showed higher path coefficients from endpoint error to
action evaluation (marked in superscript a in Table 1). Participant
10 in the mask L condition showed no significant path coefficients
(marked in superscript b in Table 1). Participant 11 in the mask R
condition showed a value from velocity change to action
evaluation comparable to that from endpoint error to action
evaluation (marked in superscript c in Table 1).
In summary, 15 participants in the mask L condition and 17
participants in the mask R condition showed a predominant role
of velocity change caused by the prime stimulus during movement
Figure 2. Action evaluation of one’s own motor behavior. (A)
Mean evaluation scores in the congruent-green and incongruent-blue
conditions of the practice phase. Error bars indicate the SDs of the
evaluation scores between participants. (B) Difference of evaluation
scores between the congruent-green and incongruent-blue conditions
of the practice phase. Triangles denote the data for each participant of
the ‘‘not aware’’ group, those who did not report an association
between their own performance and the color cue. Circles denote that
of the ‘‘aware’’ group, those who reported an association between their
own performance and the color cue.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g002
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Average reach trajectory to the far target of each side in each condition
for a single participant. Green and blue curves show trajectories when
prime-mask combinations were congruent (RR and LL conditions) and
incongruent (LR and RL conditions), respectively. (B) Average X velocity
profile in each far-target condition for a single participant. Green and
blue curves show the velocities when the prime-mask combination was
congruent and incongruent, respectively. Red dashed curves denote
61 SD of velocities between trials. The data were aligned at the button
release. (C) Mean X velocity difference profiles (Solid: RL – LL. Dashed:
RR – LR.) calculated from the pooled data to far and near targets. The
velocity difference was calculated as the index of the response onset to
the prime stimulus. The threshold value (dotted line) was set at 0.03 m/
s. (D) Mean X velocity of the 100-ms-time window (calculated from the
pooled data to far and near targets) corresponding to the gray area in
Fig. 3B (i.e., 200,300 ms after the prime onset) in each condition. (E)
Relationship between the awareness of the association (between the
participant’s own performance and the color cue) and the strength of
the implicit motor control induced by the invisible stimulus. The
difference of mean X velocity in the 100-ms-time window (Fig. 3D)
between RL (RR) and LL (LR) conditions for each participant was
calculated as the individual strength of the implicit motor control.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g003
Figure 4. Endpoint error induced by implicit motor control. (A)
Endpoint distribution of a single participant and its 95% confidence
ellipse in each condition of the far target. Green open circles and
crosses respectively denote RR and LL (prime-mask congruent)
conditions; blue open circles and crosses respectively denote LR and
RL (prime-mask incongruent) conditions. Red open circles indicate the
locations of target points. (B) Mean endpoint error in each condition.
Data from both target positions (i.e., near and far conditions) were
pooled. Error bars indicate the SDs of the endpoint errors across
participants. Cong and Incong denote congruent-green and incongru-
ent-blue conditions, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g004
Figure 5. Mean evaluation scores in the practice phase. RR and
LL conditions are congruent-green conditions and LR and RL conditions
are incongruent-blue conditions. Error bars indicate the SDs of the
evaluation scores across participants. Cong and Incong denote
congruent-green and incongruent-blue conditions, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g005
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condition and three in the mask R condition showed a
predominant role of endpoint error after movement. The results
suggest that online motor correction induced by the invisible
prime stimulus is more crucial for evaluating motor behavior and
that endpoint error is somewhat of a clue for action evaluation but
its effect is much weaker than that of motor correction.
Test Phase
As in the practice phase, only correct trials in the color
identification task were analyzed. The mean correct rate of the
color identification task in the test phase was 97.5% (SD=2.2%),
indicating participants discriminated the color nearly perfectly as
they did in the practice phase.
In this phase, to investigate what information (i.e., online
sensorimotor information, endpoint error, or external color cues)
predominantly contributes to the evaluation of one’s own motor
behavior, we introduced another condition (i.e., the either
congruent-blue or incongruent-green condition), in addition to
the congruent-green, incongruent-blue, and neutral conditions.
Figure 6. Path diagram in the practice phase. Path analysis was
applied to the data of each participant. Velocity change denotes the
data of the X velocity of the 100-ms-time window corresponding to the
gray area in Fig. 3B (i.e., 200,300 ms after the prime onset), Endpoint
error denotes the endpoint errors, and action evaluation denotes the
action evaluation scores reported after each trial. The line width
between the variables schematically indicates the strength of the
relationship, and each number near the path denotes the mean
standardized path coefficient of Mask L and R conditions respectively
(see also Table 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g006
Table 1. Standardized path coefficients of each participant in the practice phase in the model in Fig. 6.
Mask L Mask R
Participant Aware VelREndPtErr EndPtErrRActEv VelRActEv VelREndPtErr EndPtErrRActEv VelRActEv
1 # 20.061 20.138* 20.675**** 20.314**** 20.075 0.755****
2 # 0.191* 20.124 20.676**** 0.198* 0.101 0.565****
3 # 20.020 20.230*** 20.406**** 20.069 20.344**** 0.553****
4 # 0.026 20.105 20.520**** 20.118 20.258*** 0.418****
5 # 0.311**** 20.258**** 20.479**** 20.560**** 20.261**** 0.663****
6 # 0.400**** 20.206* 20.440**** 20.455**** 20.252** 0.428****
7 6 0.430**** 20.548****
a 20.078 20.088 20.650****
a 0.136
8 6 20.128 20.254*** 20.504**** 20.118 20.263*** 0.350****
9 # 0.123 20.043 20.419**** 0.166 20.127 0.529****
10 # 20.060 0.077
b 0.038
b 0.351**** 0.096 0.393****
11 # 0.112 20.471****
a 20.145 20.503**** 20.322***
c 0.320***
c
12 # 20.113 20.115 20.559**** 20.127 0.037 0.692****
13 # 0.453**** 20.288**** 20.584**** 20.641**** 20.309**** 0.451****
14 6 0.119 20.260***
a 20.138 20.234*** 20.321**** 0.393****
15 6 0.224** 20.208** 20.373**** 20.383**** 20.285**** 0.557****
16 6 0.437**** 20.204* 20.339**** 0.178* 0.016 0.669****
17 # 0.295**** 20.529****
a 20.326**** 20.247*** 20.555****
a 0.296****
18 6 0.345**** 20.227*** 20.404**** 20.347**** 20.138 0.443****
19 6 0.323**** 20.068 20.253*** 20.087 20.153* 0.348****
20 # 20.108 20.184* 20.417**** 0.046 20.216*** 0.538****
21 # 0.567**** 20.550****
a 20.166* 20.451**** 20.520****
a 0.337****
Aware: # indicates the participants who reported an association between their own performance and the color cue;6indicates those who did not notice such an
association. It is noteworthy that all participants showed a higher significant action evaluation score in the congruent-green condition than in the incongruent-blue
condition.
Vel: Velocity change; EPtErr: Endpoint error; ActEv: Action evaluation.
aThe path coefficients from endpoint error to action evaluation higher than those from velocity change to action evaluation.
bNo significant path coefficients in those from velocity change to action evaluation and from endpoint error to action evaluation.
cThe comparable path coefficients in those from velocity change to action evaluation and from endpoint error to action evaluation.
****p,.001,
***p,.005,
**p,.01,
*p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.t001
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to one’s own motor behavior would affect the action evaluation or
not.
The 21 participants were divided into two groups. For one
group, the incongruent-green condition was inserted (incongruent-
green group, 11 participants); for the other, the congruent-blue
condition was inserted (congruent-blue group, 10 participants).
Motor behaviors themselves are not modulated by the
external color cue. Table 2 shows mean velocity of the 100-
ms-time window in each condition for the incongruent-green and
congruent-blue groups. The prime affected online motor behavior
in both groups (incongruent-green group: F(1, 10)=24.587,
p,.001, partial g
2=.711; congruent-blue group: F(1, 9)=49.556,
p,.001. partial g
2=.846). There were no differences among
conditions (incongruent-green group: F(2, 20)=1.860, p=.182;
congruent-blue group: F(2, 18)=1.497, p=.250). We found no
prime stimulus6condition interaction (F(2, 20)=.495, p=.617 for
the incongruent-green group; F(2, 18)=1.981, p=.167 for the
congruent-blue group).
Although the values themselves between groups seemed to be
different, these differences were due to lower mean values for a few
participants in the congruent-green group, not to the difference in
the inserted conditions. As shown in Table 3, the mean values in
the practice phase with the participants divided into the same two
groups as in the test phase were comparable to those in the test
phase. The results indicate that motor behaviors induced by the
invisible prime stimulus were not influenced by the external color
cue.
External color cue irrelevant to action itself could be a
clue for action evaluation. Table 4 shows mean endpoint
errors in each condition for the incongruent-green and congruent-
blue groups. In the incongruent-green group, an ANOVA with
mask stimulus (right, left) and condition (congruent-green,
incongruent-blue, incongruent-green) as within-participant factors
revealed the main effect of condition (F(2, 20)=4.532, p=.0238,
partial g
2=.312) but no main effect of mask stimulus (F(1,
10)=.565, p=.469) and no condition6mask stimulus interaction
(F(2, 20)=.741, p=.490). There was a significant difference
between the congruent-green and incongruent-blue conditions,
although the value in the incongruent-green condition was not
significantly different from those in the congruent-green and
incongruent-blue conditions. In the congruent-blue group, an
ANOVA with mask stimulus (right, left) and condition (congruent-
green, incongruent-blue, congruent-blue) as within-participant
factors found the main effect of condition (F(2, 18)=6.772,
p=.006, partial g
2=.429), mask stimulus (F(1, 9)=9.236,
p=.0140, partial g
2=.506) but no condition6mask stimulus
interaction (F(2, 18)=.636, p=.541). Endpoint error in the
incongruent-blue condition was significantly larger than in the
congruent-green and congruent-blue conditions and there was no
difference between the congruent-green and congruent-blue
conditions.
Figs. 7A and 7B show the mean evaluation scores of the
incongruent-green and congruent-blue groups, respectively. In the
incongruent-green group (Fig. 7A), we conducted a planned t test
between incongruent-blue and incongruent-green conditions, but
we did not find any significant differences in either of the mask
conditions (t(10)=2.026, p=.070 for the left mask; t(10)=.745,
p=.474 for the right mask). In the congruent-blue group (Fig. 7B),
we conducted a planned t test between congruent-green and
congruent-blue conditions, but we did not find any significant
differences in either of the mask conditions (t(9)=1.682, p=.127
and t(9)=1.488, p=.171 for the left and right masks). These results
suggest that the action evaluation seemed to be less commonly
influenced by the color external cue across all participants.
To examine the details of individual performance, we applied
the path analysis to a hypothesized model that added the path
from the color cue (green cue=1, blue cue=0 as dummy
variables) in the action evaluation (Fig. 8) to the model in the
practice phase shown in Fig. 6. We found no VIFs over 10 in the
analysis of each participant. Table 5 summarizes the standardized
path coefficients for each participant and Fig. 8 shows the mean
path coefficients of mask L and R conditions. By adding the path
from the color cue to the action evaluation, the effect of velocity
change was decreased, although it still played a substantial role,
and the color cue modulated the action evaluation in some
participants. Specifically, the number of the participants who
showed the predominant contribution of online motor correction
(i.e., velocity change) in the action evaluation decreased (15 -. 6
for the mask L condition; 17 -. 11 for the mask R condition,
marked in superscript b in Table 5), while participants who
showed the predominant contribution of the external associated
color cue in the action evaluation emerged (six participants in the
mask L condition; three in the mask R condition, marked
superscript c in Table 5).
The results suggest that online sensorimotor information
induced by implicit motor control is the main source for the
action evaluation and that the endpoint error is a moderate clue in
the test phase as well as in the practice one. Furthermore, the path
analysis applied for each participant revealed that some partici-
pants used the external color cue irrelevant to their own motor
behavior as a clue for the action evaluation and that doing so
resulted in a biased action evaluation (i.e., misattribution).
Table 2. Mean velocity of the 100-ms-time window in each condition of incongruent-green and congruent-blue groups in the test
phase.
Prime L R Prime
Incongruent-green group Condition Cong-gr Incong-bl Incong-gr Cong-gr Incong-bl Incong-gr
Mean 274.5 266.7 261.3 44.7 44.3 46.9 F(1, 10)=24.6
SD (102.5) (101.3) (97.8) (89.7) (79.5) (90.2) p,.001
Congruent-blue group Condition Cong-gr Incong-bl Cong-bl Cong-gr Incong-bl Cong-bl
Mean 2183.0 2178.0 2186.2 247.6 236.5 222.9 F(1, 9)=49.6
SD (80.2) (77.0) (94.2) (93.8) (93.8) (97.7) p,.001
Cong-gr, Incong-bl, Incong-gr, and Cong-bl denote congruent-green, incongruent-blue, incongruent-green, and congruent-blue conditions, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.t002
Internal and External Cues for Action Evaluation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34985Discussion
The goals of this experiment were 1) to examine the effect of
implicit perception on online motor control under a condition in
which invisibility of the prime stimulus was confirmed by
obtaining the perceptual threshold of the prime stimulus intensity
for each participant, 2) to investigate how we evaluate our own
implicitly emerging motor behaviors induced by the invisible
prime, and 3) to identify what information (i.e., internal
sensorimotor information, consequent endpoint error, or an
external associative cue) is crucial for such action evaluation, or
specifically, to verify whether the action evaluation is modulated
by an external cue irrelevant to our own motor behavior. We
found that the invisible prime affects online control of reaching
movement, as shown by previous research (e.g., [30,31]), and we
found a correlation between the action evaluation score and
movement induced by the invisible prime, suggesting that
monitoring online sensorimotor information is crucial for evalu-
ating our own motor behavior. Furthermore, the results in the test
phase suggested the effect of external color cues on action
evaluation would emerge in some cases.
Implicit Online Motor Control Induced by Invisible Visual
Stimulus
The visual backward masking paradigm in goal-directed
reaching tasks (e.g., [30,31]) is a good probe for inducing implicit
motor control, as Song and Nakayama [29] pointed out. Under
such conditions, when the direction of the invisible prime triangle
was incongruent with that of the mask triangle, the trajectory
initially followed the direction of the prime stimulus (i.e., the
direction opposite to the goal) and was then modified to the
perceptually instructed (mask) direction (see Fig. 1C; note that the
mask stimulus was also a cue stimulus for the reaching direction).
Schmidt and his colleagues presented the rapid chase theory
[32,40,41], where ‘‘primes and targets elicit feedforward sweeps
that traverse the visuomotor system in strict sequence, without any
temporal overlap’’ [42]. According to this theory, each sweep of
the prime and target is able to directly start the independent motor
responses in compliance with each stimulus and there is no need
for conscious control. This theory could explain such early
trajectory deviation induced by the invisible prime stimulus. The
present results are in line with the rapid chase theory. The analysis
of velocities showed that the effect of the prime began after
approximately 200 ms (Fig. 3C). This latency was a little longer
than in previous studies that applied the target location change
paradigm (e.g., [10,43–45]), in which the response latency was
,150 ms. This greater latency may reflect the fact that the
reaching movement in the current study did not involve a target
location shift, but a change in a central cue. It could also be due to
slower sensorimotor processing for shape information [46].
Further investigation of subliminal shape information processing
in the online control of reaching (cf. [40]) will contribute to our
understanding of the interaction mechanism between the dorsal
stream and the ventral system (e.g., [29,47]). In summary, the
present study showed that a visual stimulus without perceptual
awareness indeed influences online motor control of reaching
movement.
Conscious Monitoring of Implicitly Driven Motor
Behavior
We found that the action evaluation was correlated with the
motor behavior induced by the invisible prime stimulus (i.e.,
velocity change induced approximately 200 ms after the prime
onset). In the practice phase, participants reported a greater feeling
of action smoothness when the prime direction was congruent with
the mask one (congruent-green condition) and a lower score when
Table 3. Mean velocity of the 100-ms window in each condition of incongruent-green and congruent-blue groups in the practice
and test phases.
Incongruent-green group Congruent-blue group
Mask L R L R
P r i m e L RL RL RL R
Practice phase Mean 288.1 33.8 282.8 30.7 2177.2 236.0 2174.3 236.3
SD (62.9) (60.5) (61.9) (60.9) (95.1) (83.6) (90.6) (79.2)
Test phase Mean 274.5 44.3 266.7 44.7 2183 236.5 2178 247.6
SD (102.5) (79.5) (101.3) (89.7) (80.2) (93.8) (77.0) (93.8)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.t003
Table 4. Mean endpoint errors in each condition of incongruent-green and congruent-blue groups in the test phase.
Mask L R Mask Condition
Incongruent-green group Condition Cong-gr Incong-bl Incong-gr Cong-gr Incong-bl Incong-gr
Mean 2.17 2.75 2.5 1.87 2.43 2.48 F (1, 10) =0.57 F (2, 20) =4.53
SD (0.67) (0.69) (0.72) (0.55) (1.27) (1.14) n.s. p=.0238
Congruent-blue group Condition Cong-gr Incong-bl Cong-bl Cong-gr Incong-bl Cong-bl
Mean 3.50 4.28 3.48 2.70 3.16 2.49 F (1, 9)=9.24 F (2, 18)=6.77
SD (1.95) (2.99) (1.92) (1.23) (1.75) (1.29) p=.0140 p=.006
Abbreviations are the same as in Table 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.t004
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ent-blue condition), as shown in Fig. 2A. There are two possible
motor clues for action evaluation: (i) afferent information from the
motor behavior modulated by the invisible prime and (ii) endpoint
error. Path analyses (Fig. 6) revealed that a majority of the
participants used appropriately afferent information from their
own motor behavior for action evaluation, while the endpoint
error also provided a moderate clue for such evaluation. An
interesting result of the present study is that, although the endpoint
error is a kind of apparent cue, online kinematics change induced
by the invisible prime was a more predominant cue for action
evaluation than the endpoint error. The appropriate monitoring of
online sensorimotor information induced by a non-perceptual
stimulus in the present study indicates the dissociation between
motor awareness and perceptual awareness as Johnson and
Haggard [12] argued, while several studies have suggested that
normal individuals are poorly aware of many aspects of their
intentional motor acts [27,48,49].
A recent patients’ study of anosognosia for hemiplegia
demonstrated that motor and premotor areas (particularly area
6) are mainly involved in motor awareness [50]. Haggard and
Magno [51] also demonstrated that motor awareness arises
somewhere between the primary motor and premotor cortex.
While neural bases of motor awareness are assumed to lie in the
areas mentioned above, the involvement of the anterior cingulate
cortex and the lateral prefrontal cortex in action monitoring has
been demonstrated (e.g., [52]). How motor awareness is involved
in action evaluation and what neural mechanism underlies such
processing are open questions for further investigation.
The number of participants who showed a significant standard
path coefficient in the mask L condition was smaller than in the
mask R condition. This tendency may reflect the task difficulty due
to biomechanical constraints [53,54]. Participants reported that
reaching to the left target was more difficult than reaching to the
right one, and the reaching endpoint error in the mask L condition
was indeed larger than in the mask R condition (Fig. 4B), so such
reports are consistent with the present results. Specifically, the task
itself (i.e., reaching to the left target) was difficult, so the online
sensorimotor information of the modulated motor behavior did
not function well for some participants in evaluating their own
action.
In summary, the results demonstrate that we can monitor motor
behavior modulated by implicit perception even when such
perception makes it impossible for us to detect the source of
disrupted motor behavior and that the online sensorimotor
information from such modulated motor behavior is fundamental
for the action evaluation.
Biased Action Evaluation Deluded by External Color Cue
Irrelevant to Own Motor Behavior
We found that the color cue did not influence the prime effect
on the motor behavior itself. As for the action evaluation, the
associative color cue did not seem to significantly contribute to the
action evaluation (Fig. 7). However, path analyses revealed that
some participants used the associative color cue for the action
evaluation. In the present study, color cues were associated with
the prime-mask congruency in the practice phase, and color cues
that were not correlated were inserted in the test phase, so we
could test whether the action evaluation depends more strongly on
the actual sensorimotor signal or on a visual proxy for the
sensorimotor signal. The color cue had high reliability even in the
test phase, so participants could have used this color information
inferentially for the action evaluation process. The results suggest
that internal sensorimotor information makes a large contribution,
while proxy color cues make some contribution. Cognitive
psychology studies have demonstrated how people attribute and
evaluate actions in various situations (e.g., [55]). A recent study
demonstrated, in a simple decision task, that participants fail to
notice conspicuous mismatches between their intended choice and
the outcome they are presented with and that in even such a
Figure 7. Mean evaluation scores in the test phase. (A)
Incongruent-green group and (B) congruent-blue group. Cong-gr,
Incong-bl, Cong-bl, and Incong-gr denote congruent-green, incongru-
ent-blue, congruent-blue, and incongruent-green conditions, respec-
tively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g007
Figure 8. Path diagram in the test phase. In addition to the
variables in the practice phase (i.e., velocity change, endpoint error, and
action evaluation), a color cue, the color (green or blue) of the fixation
point during each trial, was added. The color cue was nominal scale, so
we used a dummy variable for the analysis; that is, blue was
transformed to 0 and green was transformed to 1. The line width
between the variables schematically indicates the strength of the
relationship, and each number near the path denotes the mean
standardized path coefficient of Mask L and R conditions respectively
(see also Table 5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034985.g008
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choose the way they do [56].
The task of the present experiment was a motor task rather than
a simple decision task, so participants mainly used their online
sensorimotor information. But even in such a motor task, the
inferential process might be driven by modulating task difficulty.
As mentioned above, participants reported that reaching to the left
target was more difficult than reaching to the right one. The larger
number of participants who used the color cue for action
evaluation in the left mask stimulus condition (i.e., six participants)
than in the right mask one (i.e., three participants) reflects a
decreasing contribution of the online sensorimotor information
from the modulated behavior with increasing task difficulty.
Specifically, when the task is more difficult (i.e., the target point is
left), confidence in the online action monitoring system decreases
and the action evaluation is inferred retrospectively from the
external color cue and/or the endpoint error. In such a situation,
in particular, misattribution to the external color cue irrelevant to
one’s own motor behavior occurs. Each contribution of the
internal sensorimotor information, external color cue, and
endpoint error for the action evaluation is in line with recent
studies that examined simple manual action, which suggested that
predictive and inferential processes involve the experience of
action (e.g., [23,57,58]).
In conclusion, the action evaluation is presumably modulated
retrospectively by information that is superficially and arbitrarily
associated with motor performance, as well as with the
fundamental effect of the online sensorimotor information.
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